Funder
Agence Nationale de la Recherche
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability
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