Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Entry with two correlated signals: the case of industrial espionage and its positive competitive effects

Published:2021-01-07 Issue:1 Volume:50 Page:241-278
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Barrachina Alex,Tauman Yair,Urbano Amparo^ORCID

Funder

Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España

Conselleria d'Educació, Investigació, Cultura i Esport

Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00182-020-00748-8.pdf

Reference37 articles.

1. Albaek S, Overgaard PB (1992a) Advertising and Pricing to Deter or Accommodate Entry When Demand Is Unknown: Comment. Int J Ind Organ 12(1):83–87

2. Albaek S, Overgaard PB (1992b) Upstream Pricing and Advertising Signal Downstream Demand. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1(4):677–698

3. Bagwell K (1992) A Model of Competitive Limit Pricing. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 1(4):585–606

4. Bagwell K (2007) Signalling and Entry Deterrence: A Multidimensional Analysis. Rand J Econ 38(3):670–697

5. Bagwell K, Ramey G (1988) Advertising and Limit Pricing. Rand J Econ 19(1):59–71

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