Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets

Published:2020-10-26 Issue:1 Volume:50 Page:105-118
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Romero-Medina Antonio^ORCID,Triossi Matteo^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractWe study the existence of group strategy-proof stable rules in many-to-many matching markets under responsiveness of agents’ preferences. We show that when firms have acyclical preferences over workers the set of stable matchings is a singleton, and the worker-optimal stable mechanism is a stable and group strategy-proof rule for firms and workers. Furthermore, acyclicity is the minimal condition guaranteeing the existence of stable and strategy-proof mechanisms in many-to-many matching markets.

Funder

Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad

Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico

Consejería de Educación, Juventud y Deporte, Comunidad de Madrid

Ministerio de Economía, Fomento y Turismo

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00182-020-00741-1.pdf

Reference30 articles.

1. Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2003) School choice: a mechanism design approach. Am Econ Rev 93:729–747. https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061

2. Abdulkadiroğlu A, Pathak PA, Roth AE (2005) The New York City high school match. Am Econ Rev 95:364–367. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425

3. Abdulkadiroğlu A, Sönmez T (2013) Matching markets: theory and practice. In: Acemoglu A, Arellano M, Deckel E (eds) Advances in economics and econometrics, tenth world congress, vol II. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 3–47

4. Alkan A (1999) On the properties of stable many-to-many matchings under responsive preferences. In: Alkan A, Aliprantis CD, Yannelis NC (eds) Current trends in economics: theory and applications. Studies in economic theory, vol 8. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp 29–39

5. Balinski M, Sönmez T (1999) A tale of two mechanisms: student placement. J Econ Theory 84:73–94. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2469

Cited by 5 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Lattices and Many-to-Many Matches in the Contractor Market;2024

2. Unique stable matchings;Games and Economic Behavior;2023-09

3. A Unified Approach to Strategic Network Formation and Classical Matching Theory;SSRN Electronic Journal;2023

4. Many-to-many perfect matching;Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Advanced Information Science and System;2022-11-25

5. Fuzzy Reciprocity: Contracting Limitations in Bidirectional Matching Markets;SSRN Electronic Journal;2020