Abstract
AbstractThe aim of this work is to investigate the problem of Logical Omniscience in epistemic logic by means of truthmaker semantics. We will present a semantic framework based on $$\varvec{W}$$
W
-models extended with a partial function, which selects the body of knowledge of the agents, namely the set of verifiers of the agent’s total knowledge. The semantic clause for knowledge follows the intuition that an agent knows some information $$\varvec{\phi }$$
ϕ
, when the propositional content that $$\varvec{\phi }$$
ϕ
is contained in her total knowledge. We will argue that this idea mirrors the philosophical conception of immanent closure by Yablo (2014), giving to our proposal a strong philosophical motivation. We will discuss the philosophical implications of the semantics and we will introduce its axiomatization.
Funder
University of Genoa
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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