Abstract
AbstractWhile knowledge of mere possibilities is difficult to understand, knowledge of possibilities that are actual seems unproblematic (as far as we know the actual world). The principle that what is actual is possible has been near-universally accepted. After summarizing some sporadic dissent, I present a proposal for how the validity of the principle might be restricted. While the principle certainly holds for sufficiently inclusive objective and epistemic possibilities, it may not hold when the accessibility of possibilities is contextually restricted.
Funder
Università degli Studi di Milano
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference40 articles.
1. Berenstain, N., Ladyman, J. (2012). Ontic Structural Realism and Modality. In E. Landry, E., D. Rickles, (ed.), Structural Realism, 149–168. Springer.
2. Blackburn, S. (1993). Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford University Press.
3. Blackburn, P., et al. (2007). Handbook of Modal Logic. Elsevier.
4. Chalmers, D. (2002). Does Conceivability Entail Possibility? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Conceivability and Possibility (pp. 71–125). Clarendon Press.
5. Clarke-Doane, J. (2019). Modal Objectivity. Noûs, 53, 266–295.