Abstract
AbstractWe present a revenge argument for non-reflexive theories of semantic notions – theories which restrict the rule of assumption, or (equivalently) initial sequents of the form φ ⊩ φ. Our strategy follows the general template articulated in Murzi and Rossi [21]: we proceed via the definition of a notion of paradoxicality for non-reflexive theories which in turn breeds paradoxes that standard non-reflexive theories are unable to block.
Funder
Austrian Science Fund
Paris Lodron University of Salzburg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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