Roads to Necessitarianism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Roads to Necessitarianism

Published:2020-06-16 Issue:1 Volume:50 Page:89-96
ISSN:0022-3611
Container-title:Journal of Philosophical Logic
language:en
Short-container-title:J Philos Logic

Author:

Mandelkern Matthew^ORCID,Rothschild Daniel

Abstract

AbstractWe show that each of three natural sets of assumptions about the conditional entails necessitarianism: that anything possible is necessary. Since most agree that this conclusion is obviously false, this shows that at least one member of each set of assumptions must be rejected. All of these assumptions are, however, widely accepted and well-motivated. This creates a puzzle which we leave open.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10992-020-09562-9.pdf

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