Abstract
AbstractRecently, Wilcox (JGPS 51: 65–87, 2020) argued against the so-called wide interval view and in favor of the principle of indifference as the correct response to unspecific evidence. Embedded in a formal model of the beliefs of an agent, the former presupposes imprecise probabilities and the latter numerically precise degrees of belief. His argument is illustrated by a thought experiment that comes with a fundamental intuition. According to Wilcox, the wide interval view is incompatible with this intuition and, thus, undermined. In contrast, I show that the intuition behind the thought experiment is, in fact, compatible with the wide interval view if it is embedded into a specific conception of imprecise probabilities as model of belief. This conception is an extension of a framework which I call modified supervaluationism (MSV) and which I recently presented elsewhere (Karge 2021, 175–191). To accommodate the thought experiment’s fundamental intuition, it introduces a notion of second-order beliefs.
Funder
Technische Universität Dresden
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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