Abstract
AbstractThe present paper probes the relation between the metaphysics of human freedom and the Rothbardian branch of Austrian economics. It transpires that Rothbard and his followers embrace metaphysical libertarianism, which holds that free will is incompatible with determinism and that the thesis of determinism is false as pertaining to human action. However, as we demonstrate, their economics with its reliance on value scales requires for its tenability compatibilist freedom. Moreover, we attempt to show that the notion of value scales (or preferences) postulated by them implies that value scales are determinative of choices people make. We contend that it is for this reason that the said Austrians should jettison their metaphysical libertarianism.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference74 articles.
1. Austin, J. 1961. “Ifs and cans”. In Philosophical papers, eds. J. O. Urmson, and G. Warnock, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2. Beebee, H., and A. Mele. 2002. “Humean compatibilism”. Mind 111: 201–224.
3. Block, W. 1980. “On Robert Nozick’s ‘On austrian methodology’”. Inquiry: A Journal of Medical Care Organization, Provision and Financing 23 (4): 397–444.
4. Block, W. 1999. “Austrian theorizing, recalling the foundations: reply to Caplan”. Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 2 (4): 21–39.
5. Block, W. 2009a. “Rejoinder to Machaj on indifference”. New Perspectives on Political Economy 5 (1): 665–671.