Dedekind and Wolffian Deductive Method

Abstract

AbstractDedekind’s methodology, in his classic booklet on the foundations of arithmetic, has been the topic of some debate. While some authors make it closely analogue to Hilbert’s early axiomatics, others emphasize its idiosyncratic features, most importantly the fact that no axioms are stated and its careful deductive structure apparently rests on definitions alone. In particular, the so-called Dedekind “axioms” of arithmetic are presented by him as “characteristic conditions” in the definition of the complex concept of a simply infinite system. Making sense of Dedekind’s method may be dependent on an analysis of the classical model of deductive science, as presented by authors from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Studying the modern reconstructions of Euclidean geometry, we show that they did not presuppose deductive independence of the axioms from the definitions. Authors like Wolff elaborated a mathematics based on definitions, and the Wolffian model of deductive science shows significant coincidences with Dedekind’s method, despite the great differences in content and approach. Wolff had a conception of definitions as genetic, which bears some similarities with Kant’s idea of synthetic definitions: they are understood as positing the content of mathematical concepts and introducing thought objects (Gedankendinge) that are the objects of mathematics. The emphasis on the spontaneity of the understanding, which can be found in this philosophical tradition, can also be fruitfully related with Dedekind’s idea of the “free creation” of mathematical objects.