Abstract
AbstractCan order markets lead participants towards price-taking equilibrium? Viewing market sessions as steps of iterative algorithms, this paper indicates positive prospects for convergence. Mathematical arguments turn on convolution, efficiency and generalized gradients. Economic arguments revolve around reservation costs, derived from indifference or threshold payments for quantities supplied or demanded.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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