Abstract
AbstractEuropeanisation has marginalised national parliaments and their democratic practices leading to a ‘de-parliamentarisation’ within the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon included substantive provisions designed to improve participation by national parliaments in EU decision-making, the most significant of which is the allocation of subsidiarity monitoring. This was intended to address concerns that national parliaments are peripheral within the EU Polity, and that EU legislation lacks legitimacy amongst its citizens. Protocols 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon promote a horizontal political dialogue between national parliaments within subsidiarity monitoring, but, experience of the last ten year indicates that this has not improved legislative legitimacy, nor adequately addressed de-parliamentarisation. This article argues that, while the Treaty of Lisbon has enhanced the privileges of national parliaments, they have not been ‘re-centred’ as an influential collective bloc of actors within the EU’s institutional framework.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Law,Political Science and International Relations
Reference19 articles.
1. Cooper, I.: The watchdogs of subsidiarity: national parliaments and the logic of arguing in the EU. J. Common Mark. Stud. 44, 281–304 (2006)
2. Cooper, I.: A “virtual third chamber” for the European Union? National parliaments after the treaty of Lisbon. West Eur. Polit. 35, 441–465 (2012)
3. Cygan, A.: The parliamentarisation of EU decision-making? The impact of the treaty of Lisbon on national parliaments. Eur. Law Rev. 36, 480–499 (2011)
4. Cygan, A.: Accountability, Parliamentarism and Transparency in the EU: The Role of National Parliaments. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Glos (2013)
5. Fromage, D.: The second yellow card on the EPPO proposal: an encouraging development for member state parliaments? Yearb. Eur. Law 35, 5–27 (2015)