Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules

Published:2019-03-11 Issue:4 Volume:28 Page:787-804
ISSN:0926-2644
Container-title:Group Decision and Negotiation
language:en
Short-container-title:Group Decis Negot

Author:

Lepelley Dominique^ORCID,Smaoui Hatem

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,General Social Sciences,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),General Decision Sciences

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10726-019-09618-5.pdf

Reference15 articles.

1. Baldwin J (1926) The technique of the Nanson preferential majority system of election. Trans Proc R Soc Vict 39:42–52

2. Felsenthal DS, Nurmi H (2017) Monotonicity failures afflicting procedures for electing a single candidate. Springer, New York

3. Felsenthal DS, Nurmi H (2018) Monotonicity violations by Borda’s elimination and Nanson’s rules: a comparison. Forthcoming in Group Decision and Negotiation; published online on June 07 2018 at https://rdcu.be/Uyqb

4. Felsenthal DS, Tideman TN (2013) Varieties of failure of monotonicity and participation under five voting methods. Theor Decis 75:59–77

5. Gehrlein WV (1982) Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules. Math Soc Sci 2:123–130

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