Abstract
AbstractDepersonalization/Derealization Disorder (DPD) is a psychopathological condition in which subjects suffer from a massive alienation from themselves and the world around them. In recent years, several philosophers have proposed accounts that explain DPD in terms of an alteration in global features of normal consciousness, such as ‘mineness’. This article criticizes such accounts and develops an alternative approach, based on the observation that many mental states relate to the subject because of the kind of state they belong to. I argue that most symptoms of DPD can be understood as impairments in such forms of self-relation.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Cognitive Neuroscience,Philosophy
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