A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks

Published:2012 Issue: Volume: Page:224-235
ISSN:1867-8211
Container-title:Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Author:

Borndörfer Ralf,Omont Bertrand,Sagnol Guillaume,Swarat Elmar

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-3-642-35582-0_17

Reference7 articles.

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2. Borndörfer, R., Sagnol, G., Swarat, E.: An IP approach to toll enforcement optimization on german motorways. Tech. Rep. ZIB, Report 11-42, Zuse Institut Berlin (2011)

3. Lecture Notes in Computer Science;C. Daskalakis,2009

4. Hildebrand, M.D., Prentice, B.E., Lipnowski, I.: Enforcement of highway weight regulations: A game theoretic model. Journal of the Transportation Research Forum 30(2) (1990)

5. Ibaraki, T., Katoh, N.: Resource allocation problems: algorithmic approaches. MIT Press (1988)

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