1. Albers, Wulf (1988). Revealed aspirations and reciprocal loyalty in apex games. In R. Tietz, W. Albers, & R. Selten (Eds.), Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets (pp. 303–316). Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 314. Berlin: Springer.
2. Albers, Wulf (1994). Ten rules of bargaining sequences. In U. Schulz, W. Albers, U. Muller (eds.): Social Dilemmas and Cooperation (pp. 429–467). Berlin: Springer.
3. Albers, Wulf (1996). Adaptation of aspiration levels. Theory and experiment. In W. Girth et al. (eds.): Understanding Strategic Interaction. Essays in Honor to Reinhard Selten (pp. 345–385). Berlin: Springer.
4. Albers, W. (1997). Foundations of a Theory of Prominence in the Decimal System. Part I - Part V. University of Bielefeld, Institute of Mathematical Economics, Working Papers No. 265, 266, 269–271.
5. Albers, W. & Laing, J.D. (1991). Prominence, competition, learning and the generation of offers in a computer aided experimental spatial games. In R. Selten (ed.): Game equilibrium models III. Strategic bargaining (pp. 141–185). Berlin: Springer.