The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests

Published:2016-05-14 Issue:4 Volume:63 Page:925-942
ISSN:0938-2259
Container-title:Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Econ Theory

Author:

Einy Ezra,Moreno Diego,Shitovitz Benyamin

Funder

Ministerio Economía y Competitividad (Spain)

Comunidad de Madrid

Israel Science Foundation

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00199-016-0974-3.pdf

Reference16 articles.

1. Baye, M., Hoppe, H.: The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Games Econ. Behav. 44, 217–226 (2003)

2. Clark, D., Riis, C.: Contest success functions: an extension. Econ. Theory 11, 201–204 (1998)

3. Denter, P., Morgan, J., Sisak, D.: Where ignorance is bliss, ’tis folly to be wise: transparency in contests. University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science Discussion Paper No. 1128 (2011)

4. Einy, E., Moreno, D., Shitovitz, B.: The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly. Games Econ. Behav. 44, 272–285 (2003)

5. Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Moreno, D., Sela, A., Shitovitz, B.: Equilibrium existence in Tullock contests with incomplete information. J. Math. Econ. 61, 241–245 (2015)

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1. Costly information providing in binary contests;Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence;2024-07-27

2. Voluntary Disclosure in Asymmetric Contests;Review of Economic Studies;2024-05-24

3. Tractable Binary Contests;ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation;2023-10-26

4. Obtaining and Providing Partial Information in Binary Contests;2022 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT);2022-11

5. On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests;Journal of Economic Theory;2022-03

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