Abstract
AbstractWe characterize Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players in terms of approximate equilibria of large finite games. This characterization precisely describes the relationship between the equilibrium sets of the two classes of games. In particular, it yields several approximation results for Nash equilibria of games with a continuum of players, which roughly state that all finite-player games that are sufficiently close to a given game with a continuum of players have approximate equilibria that are close to a given Nash equilibrium of the non-atomic game.
Funder
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
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