On the structure of stable tournament solutions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the structure of stable tournament solutions

Published:2016-12-23 Issue:2 Volume:65 Page:483-507
ISSN:0938-2259
Container-title:Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Econ Theory

Author:

Brandt Felix^ORCID,Brill Markus^ORCID,Seedig Hans Georg,Suksompong Warut

Funder

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft

Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00199-016-1024-x/fulltext.html

Reference43 articles.

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3. Bordes, G.: Some more results on consistency, rationality and collective choice. In: Laffont, J.J. (ed.) Aggregation and Revelation of Preferences, Chapter 10, pp. 175–197. North-Holland, Amsterdam (1979)

4. Brandl, F., Brandt, F., Seedig, H.G.: Consistent probabilistic social choice. Econometrica 84(5), 1839–1880 (2016)

5. Brandt, F.: Minimal stable sets in tournaments. J. Econ. Theory 146(4), 1481–1499 (2011)

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