A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games

Published:2007-10-23 Issue:3 Volume:37 Page:357-394
ISSN:0938-2259
Container-title:Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Econ Theory

Author:

Anderlini Luca,Gerardi Dino,Lagunoff Roger

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00199-007-0293-9.pdf

Reference35 articles.

1. Abreu D., Dutta P.K. and Smith L. (1994). The folk theorem for repeated games: a neu condition. Econometrica 62: 939–948

2. Aliprantis C.D., Camera G. and Puzzello D. (2007). Anonymous markets and monetary trading. J Monet Econ 54: 1905–1928

3. Aliprantis C.D., Camera G. and Puzzello D. (2007). Contagion equilibria in a monetary model. Econometrica 75: 277–282

4. Anderlini, L., Gerardi, D., Lagunoff, R.: Social memory and evidence from the past. Mimeo (2007)

5. Anderlini, L., Gerardi, D., Lagunoff, R.: A ‘Super’ Folk Theorem in dynastic repeated games. Mimeo, Georgetown University and the Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 1490. http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/la2/Folktheorem.htm (2005)

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