Two families of values for global cooperative games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Two families of values for global cooperative games

Published:2024-04-03 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:0938-2259
Container-title:Economic Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Econ Theory

Author:

Alonso-Meijide J. M.^ORCID,Álvarez-Mozos M.^ORCID,Fiestras-Janeiro M. G.^ORCID,Jiménez-Losada A.^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractA global (cooperative) game describes the utility that the whole set of players generates depending on the coalition structure they form. These games were introduced by Gilboa and Lehrer (Int J Game Theory 20:129–147, 1991) who proposed and characterized a generalization of the Shapley value. We introduce two families of point valued solutions that contain the Gilboa–Lehrer value. We characterize each family by means of reasonable properties, which are related to the ones used by Gilboa and Lehrer.

Funder

Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación

Consellería de Cultura, Educación e Ordenación Universitaria, Xunta de Galicia

Agència de Gestió d’Ajuts Universitaris i de Recerca

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00199-024-01567-8.pdf

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