Abstract
AbstractIn the paper, after clarifying terms such as ‘identity’, ‘self’ and ‘personhood’, I propose an empirical account of identity based on the notion of “whole phenotype”. This move allows one to claim the persistence of the individuals before and after their being affected by dementia. Furthermore, I show how this account permits us to address significant questions related to demented individuals’ loss of the capacity of moral decisions.
Funder
Università degli Studi di Ferrara
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous),History
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