Intentionality as Tendency and Intentionality as Consciousness-of

Abstract

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that according to Edmund Husserl “tendency” does not designate a specific class of intentional experiences but rather, on par with “consciousness-of,” a universal mode of intentionality essential for any constitution of sense. In doing so, I explicate Husserl’s distinction between intentionality as tendency (Tendenz), which he describes as a striving (Streben), and intentionality as consciousness-of (Bewusstsein-von), which he describes as a presentation (Vorstellung) of an intentional object. Then, I discuss Husserl’s problematic way of relating these two universal modes of intentionality. Although he claims that intentionality as tendency presupposes intentionality as consciousness-of, I argue that the universal validity of this presupposition is put into question by the consideration of drives (Triebe), which Husserl describes as passive tendencies that originally lack any consciousness of the end strived toward, and, hence, do not seem to presuppose any presentation of it. I show that the lack of intentionality as consciousness-of poses two major problems in Husserl’s account, in that it makes drives seemingly unintelligible as (i) strivings and as (ii) motivated experiences. Lastly, to find a possible solution to these problems and better clarify the relation between intentionality as tendency and intentionality as consciousness-of at the level of drives, I explore Edith Stein’s account of drives as aimless strivings governed by experiential causality (Erlebniskausalität), discussing its advantages and potential drawbacks, as well as its compatibility with Husserl’s account.