A class of power indices for voting games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A class of power indices for voting games

Published:1980-12 Issue:4 Volume:9 Page:217-232
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Bolger E. M.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01771427.pdf

Reference10 articles.

1. Banzhaf, J.R.: Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis. Rutgers Law Review19, 1965, 317–343.

2. Coleman, J.S.: Control of Collectivities and the Power of a Coalition to Act. Social Choice. Ed. by Lieberman. New York 1971.

3. Deegan, J., andE. Packel: An Axiomatized Family of Power Indices for Simplen-Person Games. Social Science Working Paper # 197, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, January, 1978.

4. Dubey, P.: Some Results on Values of Finite and Infinite Games. Ph. D. thesis, Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1975.

5. Dubey, P., A. Neyman, and.R. Weber: Value Theory Without Efficiency. Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 513, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 1979.

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