Abstract
AbstractThe objective of this case-based study is to understand how the dyadic interaction between the key governance actors can influence the decision-making aimed at directing and controlling a family firm. The study provides evidence that dyadic interaction at the back stage of the formal governance process can offer a privileged position for the family firm owners who serve on the board, and the non-family member Chair of the Board, to influence decision-making before, after and between board meetings. The cases studied suggest that dyadic interactions can serve as preparation for formal board processes and complement and clarify them, yet they also have the potential to conflict with them. Dyadic interaction is also shown to offer important relational and emotional benefits that may not necessarily be achieved through larger group interaction. The findings suggest that although the actors can self-regulate their behaviour through informal rules, the rules may imperfectly address one risk of dyadic interaction—the reduced cognitive conflict among the board.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Business and International Management
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