Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Sequential bargaining, external effects of agreement, and public intervention

Published:2011-07-15 Issue:2 Volume:105 Page:145-160
ISSN:0931-8658
Container-title:Journal of Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Econ.

Author:

Aanesen Margrethe

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,General Business, Management and Accounting

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00712-011-0220-1.pdf

Reference19 articles.

1. Aanesen M (2006a) To Russia with love? Four essays on public intervention under asymmetric intervention: The Petsjenganikel case on the Kola peninsula. Dissertation. Norut report no 08/2006

2. Aanesen M (2006b) Public intervention in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ transaction situation under varying interests of the intervening body. Environ Dev Econ 11: 393–409

3. Ausubel LM, Deneckere RJ (1989) A direct mechanism characterisation of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. J Econ Theory 48: 18–46

4. Ausubel LM, Deneckere RJ (1993) Efficient sequential bargaining. Rev Econ Stud 60: 435–461

5. Caparros A, Pereau JC, Tazdait T (2004) North–south climate change negotiations: a sequential game with asymmetric information. Public Choice 121: 455–480

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