Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Non-cooperative implementation of the nucleolus: The 3-player case

Published:1993-12 Issue:4 Volume:22 Page:345-357
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Serrano Roberto

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01240131.pdf

Reference14 articles.

1. Davis M, Maschler M (1965) The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12:223?259

2. Hart S, Mas-Colell A (1992) A model ofn-person non-cooperative bargaining. Mimeo, Harvard University

3. Krishna V, Serrano R (1990) Multilateral bargaining. Working paper 93-23. Department of Economics, Brown University

4. Maschler M (1992) The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus: A survey. In: Aumann RJ, Hart S (Eds) Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. I), Elsevier Science Publishers BV

5. Maskin E, Tirole J (1989) Markov perfect equilibrium. Mimeo, Harvard University

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