Author:
Papayannopoulos Philippos,Fresco Nir,Shagrir Oron
Abstract
AbstractComputational physical systems may exhibit indeterminacy of computation (IC). Their identified physical dynamics may not suffice to select a unique computational profile. We consider this phenomenon from the point of view of cognitive science and examine how computational profiles of cognitive systems are identified and justified in practice, in the light of IC. To that end, we look at the literature on the underdetermination of theory by evidence and argue that the same devices that can be successfully employed to confirm physical hypotheses can also be used to rationally single out computational profiles, notwithstanding IC.
Funder
Israel Science Foundation
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
History and Philosophy of Science,General Agricultural and Biological Sciences,Philosophy
Reference44 articles.
1. Burge T (1986) Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Rev 95(1):3–45
2. Coelho Mollo D (2018) Functional individuation, mechanistic implementation: the proper way of seeing the mechanistic view of concrete computation. Synthese 195(8):3477–3497
3. Crupi V (2016) Confirmation. In: Zalta EN (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2021/entries/confirmation/
4. Dewhurst J (2018) Individuation without representation Br J Philosophy Sci 69(1):103–116. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw018
5. DiSalle R, Harper W, Valluri S (1994) General Relativity and empirical success In Proceedings of the Seventh Marcel Grossman Meeting on recent developments in theoretical and experimental general relativity, gravitation, and relativistic field theories, pp 470–471
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献