Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Moral hazard and the composition of transfers: theory and evidence from cross-border transfers

Published:2013-01-31 Issue:3 Volume:14 Page:279-301
ISSN:1435-6104
Container-title:Economics of Governance
language:en
Short-container-title:Econ Gov

Author:

Amegashie J. Atsu,Ouattara Bazoumana,Strobl Eric

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,Business and International Management

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10101-013-0123-4.pdf

Reference44 articles.

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