The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data

Published:2013 Issue: Volume: Page:423-448
ISSN:
Container-title:Handbook of Insurance
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Dionne Georges

Publisher

Springer New York

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_15

Reference165 articles.

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3. Abrahamse AF, Carroll SJ (1999) The frequency of excess claims for automobile personal injuries. In: Dionne G, Laberge-Nadeau C (eds) Automobile insurance: road safety, new drivers, risks, insurance fraud and regulation. Kluwer Academic, Norwell, MA, pp 131–150

4. Akerlof GA (1970) The market for ‘Lemons’: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Q J Econ 84:488–500

5. Arnott RJ (1992) Moral hazard and competitive insurance markets. In: Dionne G (ed) Contributions to insurance economics. Kluwer Academic, Boston, MA, pp 325–358

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