Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets: Predictions and Tests

Published:2013 Issue: Volume: Page:397-422
ISSN:
Container-title:Handbook of Insurance
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Chiappori Pierre-André,Salanié Bernard

Publisher

Springer New York

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_14

Reference60 articles.

1. Abbring J, Chiappori PA, Heckman J, Pinquet J (2003a) Testing for moral hazard on dynamic insurance data. J Eur Econ Assoc (Papers and Proceedings) 1:512–521

2. Abbring J, Chiappori PA, Pinquet J (2003b) Moral hazard and dynamic insurance data. J Eur Econ Assoc 1:767–820

3. Abbring J, Chiappori PA, Zavadil T (2008) Better safe than sorry? Ex ante and ex post moral hazard in dynamic insurance data. Columbia University, Columbia, Mimeo

4. Attar A, Mariotti T, Salanié F (2011a) Nonexclusive competition in the market for lemons. Econometrica 79:1869–1918

5. Attar A, Mariotti T, Salanié F (2011b) Non-exclusive competition under adverse selection. Forthcoming in Theoretical Economics

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