Iterated prisoner's dilemma with choice and refusal of partners: Evolutionary results-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Iterated prisoner's dilemma with choice and refusal of partners: Evolutionary results

Published:1995 Issue: Volume: Page:490-502
ISSN:0302-9743
Container-title:Advances in Artificial Life
language:
Short-container-title:

Author:

Stanley E. Ann,Ashlock Dan,Smucker Mark D.

Publisher

Springer Berlin Heidelberg

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/3-540-59496-5_320.pdf

Reference17 articles.

1. Dan Ashlock, Mark D. Smucker, E. Ann Stanley, and Leigh Tesfatsion. Preferential partner selection in an evolutionary study of prisoner's dilemma. BioSystems. To appear.

2. Robert Axelrod and Lisa D'Ambrosio. Annotated bibliography on the evolution of cooperation. University of Michigan, Obtainable via ftp from host www.ipps.lsa.umich.edu in the directory /ipps/papers/coop as Evol_of_Coop_Bibliography.txt, October 1994.

3. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385–1390, 1988.

4. John Batali and Philip Kitcher. Evolutionary dynamics of alturistic behavior in optional and compulsory versions of the iterated prisoner's dilemma. In Rodney A. Brooks and Pattie Maes, editors, Artificial Life IV, pages 343–348. MIT Press, 1994.

5. Natalie S. Glance and Bernardo A. Huberman. Organizational fluidity and sustainable cooperation. In K. Carley and M. Prietula, editors, Computational Organization Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1993.

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