Author:
Clark Derek J.,Riis Christian
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science
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5. Hillman, A.L., and Riley, J.G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics 1: 17?39.
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