The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)

Published:1984 Issue:1 Volume:44 Page:147-191
ISSN:0048-5829
Container-title:Public Choice
language:en
Short-container-title:Public Choice

Author:

Weingast Barry R.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00124821.pdf

Reference57 articles.

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2. and Demsetz, H. (1972) Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, American Economic Review, 62: 777?95.

3. Armstrong, J. (1959) Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission, Virginia Law Review, 45: 795?816.

4. Barke, R. and Riker, W. (1982) A Political Theory of Regulation with Some Observations on Railway Abandonments, Carnegie Papers on Political Economy, Public Choice, 39: 73?106.

5. Baxter, W. (1970) NYSE Fixed Commission Rates, Stanford Law Review, 22: 675?712.

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