An experimental study of VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions: competing with machine bidders-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An experimental study of VCG mechanism for multi-unit auctions: competing with machine bidders

Published:2021-02-07 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1349-4961
Container-title:Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review
language:en
Short-container-title:Evolut Inst Econ Rev

Author:

Takahashi Satoshi,Izunaga Yoichi,Watanabe Naoki^ORCID

Funder

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Japan Center for Economic Research

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40844-021-00198-1.pdf

Reference9 articles.

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2. Engelmann D, Grimm V (2009) Bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions—an experimental investigation. Econ J 119:855–882

3. Kagel JH, Levin D (2001) Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: experiments with uniform price and dynamic Vickrey auctions. Econometrica 69:413–451

4. Kagel JH, Levin D (2016) Auctions: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel JH, Roth AE (eds) Handbook of experimental economics, vol II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 563–637

5. Kagel JH, Kinross S, Levin D (2001) Comparing efficient multi-object auction institutions. mimeo. Ohio State University

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