1. See Bartley, W.W., The Retreat to Commitment, New York, 1962, p. 134ff.
2. Cf. Lakatos, I., ‘Infinite Regress and Foundations of Mathematics’, Suppl. Vol. Aristotelian Society
XXXVI, 155ff. (1962).
3. Cf. Barth, E.M., Evaluaties, Van Gorcum, Assen, 1972, pp. 5–18.
4. Cf. e.g., Külpe, O., Einleitung in die Philosophie, 10th edition, S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1921, p. 183ff. and passim; for a comparative analysis and criticism of other views cf. Külpe, O., Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften, 1st vol., S. Hirzel, Leipzig, 1912, 2nd vol., 1920, 3rd vol. 1923. Külpe elaborated a critical realism in the Kantian tradition, taking up the transcendental question in a realistic interpretation. In a similar manner, Popper began with a criticism and revision of Kantianism. Cf. his book written in the early thirties. Popper, K., Die beiden Grundprobleme der Erkenntnistheorie, Mohr, Tübingen, 1979. Popper’s first criticism of Kant and his interpretation of the transcendental viewpoint is to be found in this work. This reference may be of particular interest to those who believe that critical rationalism has no connection to this kind of problem, e.g. Wellmer and other members of the Frankfurt School.
5. For a defence of the realism of common sense and of science, cf. Popper, K., Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 32 and passim, cf. also