1. See Rex (1961) and Coser’s answer in (1965, 5 and passim)
2. ‘The more one thinks of it the more he will see that conflict and co-operation are not separable things, but phases of one process which always involves something of both.’ (Coser, 1956, 18. Also Coser, 1965, ppl 1, 26.) See also Simmel: ‘Contradiction and conflict not only precede unity but are operative in it at every moment of its existence.’ (1955, 13)
3. ‘The kind of theory we have been suggesting is, by its very nature, a theory of social disruption and social change. Finally, something should therefore be said about the rather unexpected theory that conflict contributes to the stability of systems.’ (Rex, 1981, 72)
4. The question can of course be approached from the point of view of the ‘reflexive value of negation’. We know what it means to trust because we know what distrust is, we love ‘relexively’ in the mirror of the lack of love: in a similar way co-operation draws from conflict: not only are they not mutually exclusive forms of interaction, but conflict is built into cooperation itelf as secret regulative, i.e. as reflexive negation.
5. ‘Wie ist soziale Ordnung möglich?’ In Luhmann (1975c)