1. W. V. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism,’ Philosophical Review 60 (1951), 20–43, hereafter just ‘Two Dogmas.’ Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, Second Edition (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961); all page references are to the latter.
2. Gustav Bergmann, ‘Two Cornerstones of Empiricism,’ Synthese 8 (1953), 435–452; H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson, ‘In Defense of a Dogma,’ Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 141–158; Jonathan Bennett, ‘Analytic-Synthetic,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959), 163–188; Jerrold J. Katz,’ some Remarks on Quine on Analyticity,’ Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967), 36–52, ‘Where Things Now Stand with the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction,’ Synthese 28 (1974) 283–319, and elsewhere; and of course many others.
3. Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960), hereafter W&O; ‘Ontological Relativity,’ Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), 185–212; ‘Reply to Chomsky’ and ‘Reply to Hintikka,’ in D. Davidson and J. Hintikka (eds.), Words and Objections: Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1969); ‘On the Reasons for Indeterminacy of Translation,’ Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 178–183; ‘Indeterminacy of Translation Again,’ Journal of Philosophy 84 (1987), 5-10.
4. Howard Callaway has also championed meaning without analyticity; see his’ semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective,’ Philosophical Topics Supplementary Volume (1980), 61–70, and ‘Meaning without Analyticity,’ Logique et Analyse 28 (1984), 41–60. Cf. also sec. 2 of the Introduction to Georges Rey’s Mind without Consciousness, forthcoming.
5. See Harman, ‘Quine on Meaning and Existence, I,’ Review of Metaphysics 31 (1967–68), 124–151, on the present point pp. 135-137. This splendid work (here-after just “Harman”) is the classic exposition of Quine’s views on meaning; my own understanding of analyticity derives very largely from it.