1. Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University, 1996), xxiv-xxx
2. Rawls, 190–195; Raz, Morality of Freedom ( Oxford: Clarendon, 1986 ), 401–407
3. P. Nicholson, “Toleration as a Moral Ideal”, S. Mendus and J. Horton, eds., Aspects of Toleration (London: Methuen, 1985), 158–73; J. Horton, “Toleration as a Virtue”, D. Heyd, ed., Toleration: An Elusive Virtue (Princeton: Princeton University, 1996), 28–43; R. Churchill, “On the Difference between Non-Moral and Moral Conceptions of Toleration: The Case for Toleration as an Individual Virtue” in M. Razavi and D. Ambuel, eds., Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance, (Albany: State University of New York, Press 1997 ), 189–211
4. Churchill, “On the Difference between Non-Moral and Moral Conceptions of Toleration”
5. There is some question over the proper distinction between ‘tolerance’ and ‘toleration’ and the majority practice seems to be to treat them as synonyms. In this discussion I try to use ‘tolerance’ when the primary subject of discussion is the complex of beliefs, feelings, motives, and attitudes leading to the actions usually ‘behind’ actions. I will use ‘toleration’ to refer to actions (usually of forbearance) and the (largely political) conditions in which tolerant attitudes and motives are manifest publicly. I am grateful to Stephen Barker for clarifying this distinction.