1. Cf. Court of Justice of the EEC, Case 6/64 (Costa — ENEL), Jur. 1964, 1204.
2. It is well known that these goals, set out in 1957, were never achieved as originally envisaged. We are dealing with obsolete rules. This, however, makes them all the more useful as examples since we need not attend to their usually confusing practical implementation.
3. In article 33 of the 1983 Constitution, the King’s inauguration is mentioned only in passing. This is in accordance with the policy of de-constitutionalization followed in drafting the new text.
4. Ross (1968), 130–131: ‘Those enunciations in which competence is exercised are called actes juridiques, or acts-in-the-law, or, in private law, dispositive declarations. Examples are: a promise, a will, a judgment, an administrative licence, a statute. An act-in-the-law is, like a move in chess, a human act which nobody can perform as an exercise of his natural faculties. Norms of competence are, like rules of games, constitutive.’ See also Lindahl (1977), 196.
5. Ross (1968), p. 96: ‘A set of rules of competence constitutes a unity which may usually be divided into three parts: (1) those which determine personal competence, indicating what persons are qualified to participate in the procedure which creates new laws; (2) those which determine procedural competence, defining the procedure to be followed; and (3) those which determine substantial competence, indicating those matters with which the directive, issued by qualified persons in the manner prescribed, may concern itself.’ Also, D.N. MacCormick and Z. Bankowski, ‘La théorie des actes de langage et la théorie des actes juridiques’, in: P. Amselek (1986), 202–203.