1. W. W. Bartley, III, The Retreat to Commitment (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962; Chatto & Windus, 1964); German translation, revised, Flucht ins Engagement (Munich: Szczesny Verlag, 1964)
2. W. W. Bartley, III, ‘Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality’, in Mario Bunge (ed.), The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1964); and for the most up-to-date statement: ‘Critical Study: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Part III; Rationality, Criticism, and Logic’, Philosophia, Israel, February 1982.
3. W. W. Bartley, III, Theories of Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics’, in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds), Problems in the Philosophy of Science (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 40–119.
4. Compare Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (London, 1912), p. 58, “knowledge concerning what is known by description is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning what is known by acquaintance,” and p. 109: “Our derivative knowledge of truths consists of everything that we can deduce from self-evident truths by the use of self-evident principles of deduction.”Or as Rudolf Carnap writes: “This requirement for justification and conclusive foundation of each thesis will eliminate all speculative and poetic work from philosophy.... It must be possible to give a rational foundation for each scientific thesis.... the physicist does not cite irrational factors, but gives a purely empirical-rational justification. We demand the same from ourselves in our philosophical work... justification... has to take place before the forum of the understanding; here we must not refer to our intuition or emotional needs.” The Logical Structure of the World (Die logische Aufbau der Welt) (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1967), Preface to the First Edition, p. xvii.
5. Cf. Russell, Problems, op. cit., p. 111: “It is felt by many that a belief for which no reason can be given is an unreasonable belief. In the main, this view is just.”