1. Published originally in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 4, 1950, but revised and reprinted in Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity, 2nd edn., University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1956, pp. 205–221. Page references will be given to that latter version.
2. Quine’s paper is reprinted in Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, revised edition, Harvard: University Press, 1976 (WP). Word and Object, MIT Press: Cambridge MA, 1960 (WO).
3. See, for example, W.D. Hart, in Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 40, 159, April 1990, p. 256–7; “Here one might be reminded of Quine versus Carnap who wanted to consume his mathematical cake but not eat it [...] Carnap wanted to say that there are infinitely many prime numbers, but not that there are numbers out there, independent of us [...] .” See also Peter Hylton, “Translation, Meaning, and Self-Knowledge,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1990–1991, pp. 269–290.
4. Susan Haack, “Some Preliminaries to Ontology,” in Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 5, 1976, pp. 457–474. Barry Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” in Journal of Philosophy, vol. LXV, 1968, pp. 241–256, and The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987. Christopher Hookway, Quine, Polity Press: London, 1988 pp. 30–39.
5. Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” p. 243. Quine writes in a similar way: “Carnap thinks ... that the question what a theory presupposes that there is should be divided into two questions in a certain way, and I disagree,” WP, p. 129. To claim that Carnap has two categories where he in fact has four is not to say something false; but it is a standard example of pragmatic inappropriateness and is misleading.