1. Some examples of philosophical works on secession include: Allen Buchanan, Secession (Boulder: Westview, 1991); “Toward a Theory of Secession,” Ethics, 101 (1991), pp. 322–42; “Quebec, Secession and Aboriginal Territorial Rights,” The Network (March, 1992), pp. 2–4; “A Reply to Grand Chief Coon Come and Mr. David Cliché,” The Network (May, 1992), p. 13; “The Right to Self-Determination: Analytical and Moral Foundations,” Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, 8 (1990), pp. 41–50; “Self-Determination and the Right to Secede,” Journal of International Affairs, 45 (1992), pp. 347–65; “Federalism, Secession, and the Morality of Inclusion,” Arizona Law Review, 37 (1995), pp. 53–63; “Self-Determination, Secession, and the Rule of Law,” in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan, Editors, The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 301–23; “Theories of Secession,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 26 (1997), pp. 31–61; “What’s So Special About Nations?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 22 (1996), pp. 283–309; Thomas Christiano, “Secession, Democracy, and Distributive Justice,” Arizona Law Review, 37 (1995), pp. 65–72; David Copp, “Democracy and Communal Self-Determination,” in Robert McKim and Jeff McMahon, Editors, The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 277–300; “International Law and Morality in the Theory of Secession,” The Journal of Ethics, 2 (1998), pp. 219–45; J. Angelo Corlett, “The Right to Civil Disobedience and the Right to Secede,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30 (1992), pp. 19–28; “The Morality and Constitutionality of Secession,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 29 (1998), pp. 120–28; “Secession and Native Americans,” Peace Review, 12 (2000), pp. pp. 5–14; R. E. Ewin, “Peoples and Secession,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11 (1994) pp. 225–31; David Gauthier, “Breaking Up: An Essay on Secession,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24 (1994), pp. 357–71; Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, “National Self-Determination,” The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXVII (1990), pp. 439–61; David Miller, “Secession and the Principle of Nationality,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 22 (1996), pp. 261–82; Darrel Moellendorf, “Liberalism, Nationalism and the Right to Secede,” The Philosophical Forum, 28 (1996–97), pp. 87–99; Kai Nielsen, “Secession: the Case of Quebec,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 10 (1993), pp. 29–43; Daniel Philpott, “In Defense of Self-Determination,” Ethics, 105 (1995), pp. 352–85; Thomas W. Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics, 103 (1992), pp. 48–75; Christopher Wellman, “A Defense of Secession and Political Self-Determination,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 24 (1995), pp. 142–71; Burleigh Wilkins, “Secession,” Peace Review, 12 (2000), pp. 15–22.
2. Some examples of philosophical works on the Native American experience include: Allen Buchanan, “The Role of Collective Land Rights in a Theory of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 3 (1993), pp. 90–108; J. Angelo Corlett, “Reparations to Native Americans?” in Alexandar Jokic, Editor, War Crimes and Collective Wrongdoing (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), pp. 236–69 Race, Racism and Reparations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), Chapter 9; John R. Danley, “Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights, and Cultural Minorities,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20 (1991), pp. 168–85; David Lyons, “The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land,” Social Theory and Practice, 4 (1977), pp.249–72. James W. Nickel, “Ethnocide and Indigenous Peoples,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 24 (1994), pp. 84–98; James Tully, “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 11 (1994), pp. 153–80. For discussions of moral and political issues related to aborigines in Australia, see John Bigelow, Robert Pergetter and Robert Young, “Land, Well-Being and Compensation,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1990), pp. 330–46; Ross Poole, “National Identity, Multiculturalism, and Aboriginal Rights: An Australian Perspective,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 22 (1996), pp. 407–38; Janna Thompson, “Land Rights and Aboriginal Sovereignty,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1990), pp. 313–29, Taking Responsibility for the Past (Cambridge Polity, 2002).
3. Indeed, this claim might be derived from the first of John Rawls’ principles of the Law of Peoples: “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples” [John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 37]. An argument for the claim itself is provided below.
4. Buchanan, “Theories of Secession,” p. 34–5.
5. Buchanan, “Theories of Secession,” p. 36.