1. ZTW passim; ZTP, Ch VII; CTGIJ passim.
2. General description of naturalistic and anti-naturalistic attitudes, J. Kmita and L. Nowak, 1968, Ch I, II, V, VI; for neokantianism H. Rickert, 1911; for existentialist phenomenology, C. Cossio, 1964, pp. 54–100; for general hermeneutics, E. Betti, 1955, 1960, 1965, cf., also M. Reale, 1956, p. 171ff.
3. A. Naess, 1953, p. 45ff; Z. Ziembirński, 1965. p. 254ff.
4. ZTW, pp. 109–142; SHD, Ch V, VI, VIII; CTGIJ, Ch 2–4; J. Wróblewski, 1985d, 1986c; P. A. Coté, 1982, part 2, Ch 1, séc. 2; R. Dickerson, 1975, Ch 5; J. Evans, 1989, Ch 4–6; M. Dascal and J. Wróblewski, 1988; G. Gottlieb, 1968, Ch VII; K. Makkonen, 1965, par. 5; W. Twining and D. Miers, 1982, Ch 6–8, 10; The narrow conception of interpretation is used in judicial practice, cf., SC 14.03.1950 KO 46/50 PP 7, 1950; the statement that the meaning is evident and, therefore, does not require any interpretation SC 21.09.1982 IV KR 178/82 OSPIKA 1983 K 126. “Doubt” or “lack of clarity” depends on evaluation (Ch. Nutting, 1940, p. 513ff) and, therefore, sometimes an interpretation of clear texts is also postulated (P. Vander Eycken, 1907, pp. 18,344ff; D. Rubino, 1950, p. 241; G. R. Carrio, 1965, p. 45ff). Stressing the pragmatic character of doubt I do not share the opinion that interpretation is an element of each application of law (P. E. Nedbajło, 1960, p. 325; R. Pound, 1955, Ch III) or vice versa that application is an element of interpretation (N. Bobbio, 1938, p. 13 7ff). Interpretation is different from application of law (F. Somlo, 1917, p. 371) and only operative interpretation is by definition an element of some application of law processes (cf., note 6 below).
5. For the differentiation of these two kinds of interpretation, F. Studnicki, 1978, p. 41 ff ; for an example of a derivative concept of interpretation, M. Zielinski, 1972; Z. Ziembiński, 1980, Ch 3.5.1. Both kinds of interpretation are put together as “rationalist” and opposed to “hermeneutical” interpretation (M. Zirk-Sadowski, 1984, Ch 8.1). There is also an opposition between the “intensional” and “extensional” approach to interpretation (J. Wollnski, 1972, Ch IV). A special conception of interpretation is used in R. Dworkin’s theory defining law “... as an interpretive concept” (R. Dworkin, 1986b, p. 410), as “... an interpretive, self-reflective attitude addressed to politics in the broadest sense” (ibidem p. 413) cf., R R. Dworkin, 1986b, Ch 2; 1985 Ch VI, VII.