1. See also, Al27–8, B165, A159/B198, A216/B263, Prolegomena 36.
2. Buchdahl, like most English language commentators, including Michael Friedman, does not recognize any significant distinction between reason in its regulative function and reflective judgment. Serious questions regarding their identification have been raised, however, in the German literature. For a survey of this literature and the issues involved see Helga Mertens, Kommentar zur Ersten Einleitung in Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft, München: Johannes Berchmans Verlag, 1973, pp. 33–46.
3. Gerd Buchdahl, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T, Press, 1969, esp. pp. 651–665; “The Kantian ‘Dynamic of Reason’ with Special Reference to the Place of Causality in Kant’s System”, in Kant Studies Today, ed. L.W. Beck, La Salle Ill.: Open Court, 1969, pp. 187–208; “The Conception of Lawlikeness in Kant’s Philosophy of Science”, in Kant’s Theory of Knowledge, ed. L.W. Beck, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974, pp. 128–50.
4. See Lewis White Beck, “A Prussian Hume and a Scottish Kant”, Essays on Hume and Kant, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 111–129, esp. p. 126.
5. See Arthur Lovejoy, “On Kant’s Reply to Hume”, Kant: Disputed Questions, ed. Moltke S. Gram, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967, pp. 284–308;