1. On the problems a conceptualist approach (holding that normative solutions can be derived from the combination of the different elements of an offence) or a realist approach (holding that there is such a thing as a real, objective definition of action and of crime) raises in the criminal-law doctrine, cf., e. g., Nino 1980, pp. 64 ff.
2. Rodriguez Mourullo 1966, p. 221, quoted from Cobo del Rosal/Vives Antón 1984, p. 320.
3. Quoted from Gimbernat Ordeig 1990, p. 121.
4. In presenting the causal, teleological and social theories of action, I will refer to their most radical versions, in order to bring out more clearly the differences between them and to underscore the thesis of the present investigation. I am aware of the fact that there are less radical versions of each one of these theories to which some of the criticisms I will mention do not apply.
5. Quoted from Vives Antón 1996, p. 103.