1. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing,’ The Journal of Philosophy 64, 12 (June 22, 1967): 357–372
2. Innate Knowledge,’ in S. P. Stich, ed., Innate Ideas (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975)
3. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,’ The Journal of Philosophy 73, 20 (November 18, 1976), 771–791.
4. This assumption violates the thesis that Davidson calls ‘The Anomalism of the Mental’. Cf. ‘Mental Events,’ in L. Foster and J. W. Swanson, , Experience and Theory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970).
5. Keith Lehrer’s example of the gypsy lawyer is intended to show the inappropriateness of a causal requirement. (See Knowledge, Oxford: University Press, 1974, pp. 124–125.)