1. R. C. Stalnaker and R. H. Thomason, ‘A Semantic Analysis of Conditional Logic’, (mimeo., 1967). In this paper, the formal system, C2, is proved sound and semantically complete with respect to the interpretation sketched in the present paper. That is, it is shown that a formula is a consequence of a class of formulas if and only if it is derivable from the class in the formal system, C2.
2. N. Rescher, Hypothetical Reasoning, Amsterdam, 1964.
3. Cf. R. Chisholm, ‘The Contrary-to-fact Conditional’, Mind 55 (1946), 289–307, reprinted in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. by H. Feigl and W. Sellars, New York, 1949, pp. 482–497. The problem is sometimes posed (as it is here) as the task of analyzing the subjunctive conditional into an indicative statement, but I think it is a mistake to base very much on the distinction of mood. As far as I can tell, the mood tends to indicate something about the attitude of the speaker, but in no way effects the propositional content of the statement.
4. F. P. Ramsey, ‘General Propositions and Causality’, in Ramsey, Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, New York, 1950, pp. 237–257. The suggestion is made on p. 248. Chisholm, op. cit., p. 489, quotes the suggestion and discusses the limitations of the ‘connection’ thesis which it brings out, but he develops it somewhat differently.
5. N. Rescher, op. cit., pp. 11–16, contains a very clear statement and discussion of this problem, which he calls the problem of the ambiguity of belief-contravening hypotheses. He argues that the resolution of this ambiguity depends on pragmatic consideration.