1. If the being predicts that you will consciously randomize your choice, e.g., flip a coin, or decide to do one of the actions if the next object you happen to see is blue, and otherwise do the other action, then he does not put the $M in the second box.
2. Try it on your friends or students and see for yourself. Perhaps some psychologists will investigate whether responses to the problem are correlated with some other interesting psychological variable that they know of.
3. If the questions and problems are handled as I believe they should be, then some of the ensuing discussion would have to be formulated differently. But there is no point to introducing detail extraneous to the central problem of this paper here.
4. This divergence between the dominance principle and the expected utility principle is pointed out in Robert Nozick. The Normative Theory of Individual Choice,unpublished doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, 1963, and in Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision,McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965.
5. This is shorthand for: action A is done and state S12 obtains or action B is done and state S1 obtains. The ‘or’ is the exclusive or.