1. Galileo Two New Sciences (transl. and introduced by Stillman Drake), University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1974, p. 154, footnote 12.
2. Wallace’s discussion is in his Causality and Scientific Explanation, Vol. I (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1972), pp. 176f. Wallace does discuss some important aspects of Galileo’s demonstrations in his article ‘Galileo and Reasoning Ex Suppositione: The Methodology of Two New Science’ in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XXXII (Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 1974), (ed. by R. S. Cohen et al.), Reidei, Dordrecht and Boston, 1976, p. 79.
3. There is a cryptic footnote in Santillana’s edition of Dialogo (Dialogue on the Great World Systems, Salusbury translation, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953; p. 112) where in an apparently irrelevant context he cites a distinction between ‘reason’ and ‘cause’ asserted to have been made by Bruno in his De la Causa and remarks that Galileo was not unaware of this important distinction. The distinction actually seems to be that between ‘cause’ and ‘principle,’ which even in the 16th-century was an opaque distinction, though Bruno does draw it. In general, ‘principle’ — as in ‘first principle’ — is used to describe a causal or demonstrative principle.
4. A similar line is argued by J. A. Bennett in his ‘Christopher Wren: Astronomy, Architecture, and the Mathematical Sciences’ J. Hist. Astron. 6 (1974), 149–84. Bennett briefly discusses the tradition in England and argues that Wren is in it.
5. J. E. McGuire, ‘Active Principles and Neo Platonism: Newton and the Corpus Hermeticurm’ in Robert S. Westman and J. E. McGuire, Hermeticism and the Scientific Revolution, (William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, Los Angeles, 1977), pp. 95–142.